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Few political events in American history have had as large an influence as the New 
Deal had on the federal government. During FDR's first term in the White House, the 
efforts of Roosevelt's 'Brains Trust' and the legislative activity of the 73rc1 and 74'11 
Congresses led to a significant expansion in the scope and role of the federal govern-
ment. Changes in the size and responsibilities of the federal govenuue11t altered the 
American political system and placed liberals and conservatives on often unbridge-
able sides of a chasm. While liberals broadly welcomed the changes and supported 
the New Deal - and continued to support it and its progenies - conservatives opposed 
it and eventually, with the election of Ronald Reagan, began an ideological frontal 
assault on what might be called the New Deal government. Just as the 1960s shaped 
many of the cultural partitions between the Right and the Left in the United States 
today, so the 1930s shaped many of the political divisions. A number of those political 
divisions between conservatives and liberals could be traced to different interpreta-
tions of the United States Constitution, since any changes in the size or role of the 
federal government raised constitutional issues. Famously, a number of those issues 
were summarily resolved by the Supreme Court as it consistently ruled New Deal 
legislation unconstitutional until 1937, when the Court shifted suddenly, with its West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) decision, and began upholding New Deal legislation. 
Both during the 1930s and thereafter, similar canonical nanatives of the changes that 
took place in the federal government and the role of the Court established themselves 
in scholarly law journals and books, in the popular press, and in Supreme Court opi-
nions. According to what White calls the 'conventional account,' from Roosevelt 's 
election in 1932 to his 'Court-packing ' plan of 1937 and lhe subsequent judicial bles-
sing of New Deal legislation in the wake of that unsuccessful scheme, a constitutional 
revolution took place as a majority of Justices abandoned the long-dominant classical 
understanding of law and developed a new approach to constitutional issues based on 
bifurcated review of economic legislation and rights claims. This revolution changed 
the role of the Supreme Court in the American political system as judicial review 
became an important aspect of what would become the rights revolution of the twen-
tieth century. 
White examines the legitimacy of this conventional narrative by looking at three spe-
cific areas: the powers of the executive in foreign relations, the emergence and expan-
sion of the administrati ve state, and the budding freedom of expression jurisprudence 
that emerged prior to and during the New Deal era. White's goal is to revise the con-
ventional account since that account, he argues, is largely based on anachronistic -
and selective - readings of opinions (majority, concurring, and dissents) accompa-
nying the Court's decisions in a small number of critical cases. Those readings have 
been unduly influenced, White believes, by la ter events and debates. This influence 
can be seen, for example, in the tendency to read pre-1937 opinions in light of the 
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'switch in time that saved nine' or to read Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's footnote 4 in 
United States v. Carotene Products Corp. ( 1938) through the prism of the later deci-
sions by the Warren Court.2 The net effect, White argues, has been to create a mono-
lithic view of the New Deal that exaggerates both its constitutional significance and 
its internal coherence as a 'revolution ' (3 10). White does not dispute the idea that a 
significant shift occurred in American constitutional jurisprudence during the first 
half of the twentieth century, but he would re-periodize it to stretch from the 1920s to 
the post-World War Two era. 
To revise the history of the Supreme Court during the New Deal, White examines the 
works of legal scholars influential in establishing the conventional account (James 
Garner, James Landis, and others); accounts in the mainstream press, particularly the 
New York Times; contemporary treatises on foreign relations, administrative law, and 
freedom of speech; and Supreme Court opinions themselves. White juxtaposes rea-
dings of these four sources in relation to the opinions in a number of crucial deci-
sions, including United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co. (1936), United Stales v. 
Belmont (1937), Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935), Whirney v. California (1937), 
and Palko v. Connecticut (1937). As he works his way through the issues of executive 
discretion and enumerated powers and questions of federalism that shape foreign 
relations, or the evolution of administrative law and the creation of a bureaucracy of 
expertise that had roots in both the Progressive Era and the New Deal, White contin-
ually offers detailed interpretations of his sources to counter the conventional account 
of the part played by the New Deal in changing the role of courts in the American 
polity. Those readings are instructive in relation to how one might carry out revisio-
nist history in the long shadow of the linguistic and interpretive turns of the late twen-
tie th century. Rather than de-center or deconstruct his sources in this largely textual 
approach, White simply challenges the conventional readings with alternative rea-
dings and additional texts. Through numerous examples, he also demonstrates how 
easily historians and other scholars engage in a kind of reverse teleology, finding all 
manner of prophecies in opinions that conveniently foretell future developments -
when due attention is not paid to their historical (and sometimes textual) context. 
White 's treatment of the development of freedom of speech j urisprudence works as a 
nice contrapuntal theme to the usual expansive state nanative that dominates New 
Deal histmies., Whereas executive discretion in foreign relations and the growth of 
the administrative state, regardless of the magnitude of the role of the New Deal, 
clearly represent increases in the role and scope of the federal government, First 
2. The "'switch' in time that saved nine" refers to the shift in the Supreme Court's treatment of New Deal-
related cases between 1936 and 1937: where in 1935 the Court had rendered unconsti tutional both the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, from early 1937 onwards it began endor-
s ing the constitutional ity of other New Deal laws such as the Social Secmity Act and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. This 'switch,' it was argued, saved the nine Supreme Court justices hy undermining President 
Roosevelt's proposal, then under consideration hy Congress, 10 bring new justices onto the Court and encou-
rage older ones to retire. 
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Amendment jurisprudence developed in a completely different direction: the realm of 
protected expression expanded whi le the power of the state to regulate expression 
was contracted by the Supreme Court. White traces this development from the pre-
modern 'bad tendency' test, which had long dominated the American judiciary's 
approach to speech cases, to the contributions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. 
White also carefully embeds the enlargement of protected speech with Holmes's 
' marketplace of ideas' in its larger modernist sociocultural context.3 Importantly, 
here, White again demonstrates how the expansive jurisprudence of freedom of 
expression was multifaceted, contracting at times, and shifting from individual to 
social bases. 
White also examines the lionization or demonization of Justices whose opinions were 
said to hai l or fu lfi ll the New Deal or to retard it: Justices Holmes and Brandeis exem-
plifying the former, Justices McReynolds and Sutherland the latter. Alongside this 
positioning of the Justices has come the practice of labeling them ' liberal' or 'conser-
vative' on the basis of their opinions on what White suggests is an unrepresentative 
sampling of their judicial output (285). (This normative labeling practice remains 
common today despite objections from the Justices on the Court.) Finally, White exa-
mines the traditional dichotomy of substantive versus procedural due process so cru-
cial to post-Lochner bifurcated judicial review affecting redistributive regulations 
and rights and jurisprudence. This area of jurisprudence has been well mined in later 
years, a point White notes favorably, but the review in The Constitution and the New 
Deal makes an excellent introduction to this area of law. 
What White hopes to achieve is a firmer demarcation in our understanding of the 
New Deal. So demarcated, the New Deal's role in the constitu tional changes of the 
twentieth century would not be as overrated as While believes it now is. Besides offe-
ring a wealth of material readily accessible to non-jurists, White's book is a compel-
ling read and his central point about the tendency of commentators to detach the New 
Deal from its relatively brief duration is instructive. On balance, White is successfu l 
in his effort ' to peel away the layers of normative investment in the New Deal' (3 10) 
that shaped the conventional account of the development of constitutional jurispru-
dence in the United States during the twentieth century. 
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3. White traces the relationship of freedom of expression jurisprudence and modernism in greater detail in 
'The Fi rst Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in 1\vcntieth-Century America,' in 
Michigan law Review, 95, 2 (November 1996), 299-392. 
